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 Philosophers face many vexing moral problems. Though I insist several aren’t my fault, 
maybe this paper’d better not go there. Sometimes these problems depend on puzzles about 
conscious experience, such as which beings feel pain, and when. This paper is barely sensitive to 
these puzzles. Consciousness seems to depend on mental representation or meaning, on what it is 
for a mental state to be “about” some topic. Here at last we have arrived at what this paper is also 
not really about. What something means seems to depend on its teleological “functions”—what it 
is “supposed to” do, what it is somehow “defective” if it doesn’t do. And understanding 
functions is Job One here. I’ll describe a general “constructive” theory of functions which I think 
improves and unifies the dominant heretofore competing theories. We’ll get to Job One second, 





 “How it is that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes about as a result 
of irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as the appearance of Djin when Aladdin 
rubbed his lamp.” That was the pessimistic theoretical assessment at the dawn of scientific 
psychology, from the otherwise famously optimistic biologist Thomas Huxley, known as 
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“Darwin’s Bulldog”. Despite the many subsequent scientific advances in understanding the 
mechanisms of perception, thought, and communication, and despite the many subsequent 
philosophical advances in understanding the nature of mental representation and meaning, 
conscious experience is still The Rub. 
 
 Contemporary Doubting Thomases converge on a general characterization of the 
mystery. Thomas Nagel writes that “[c]onsciousness is what makes the mind-body problem 
really intractable”, identifying its most troublesome feature as follows:  
[F]undamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is 
something it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism. We may 
call this the subjective character of experience ….  
Joe Levine similarly insists that “what is at issue is the ability to explain qualitative character 
itself; why it is like what it is like to see red or feel pain”. It’d be good to give clear examples of 
conscious states beyond seeing red and feeling pain, to contrast these with clear cases of 
nonconscious states, and to give some layout of the controversial cases. Unfortunately there are 
precisely zero noncontroversial candidates for nonconscious states, and a surprisingly long list of 
controversial candidates for conscious states.  
 
Unclear consciousness and morals 
 
 Here’s the quickest and most sweeping way to see that there are no untendentious 
examples of nonconscious states. Since it is so difficult to explain experience as a combination of 
nonexperiential things, some influential philosophers have been driven, by respectable argument, 
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to the view that experience is a fundamental feature of the world, like gravitation or 
electromagnetism or whatever underlies them. But just as virtually everything exerts 
fundamental forces like gravitation and electromagnetism, so if experience is fundamental we 
might well expect virtually everything to have experiences—even cells and rocks and raindrops 
and atoms. This is called “panpsychism” or, more precisely, “panexperientialism”. To be fair we 
can’t conveniently rule panpsychism out using bedrock assumptions about which entities, if any, 
lack experiences.  
 
 To zoom in on states that are uncontroversially conscious experiences, we have to zoom 
in on creatures that are uncontroversially conscious experiencers. This calls for postponing 
discussion of:  
1a: Nonbiological beings such as laptops, robots, deities, and ghosts—(potential) robots seem 
nonconscious because they aren’t alive, but (potential) spirits seem conscious despite not 
being alive.  
1b: Nonhuman biological beings such as plants, animals, and extraterrestrial life—some 
animals seem to be experiencers (down to bugs? shrimp? lizards? pigeons? bats?), but 
perhaps a degree of self-consciousness is required for full-fledged experience, and 
perhaps only language-users qualify. At the other extreme, vegetarians tend to fall silent 
when roast-beast eaters ask how they know plants don’t feel pain (except to call attention 
to the additional plants it takes to feed the animals we eat).  
1c: Human beings far from adulthood, such as fetuses, infants, and small children—some of 
the dispute about abortion turns on whether fetuses suffer, which is an intuitively open 
question. It would be a symptom of pathology intuitively to deny experience in the face 
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of a normal newborn or a toddler, but to deny this based on the theoretical need to explain 
self-consciousness or “childhood amnesia” is merely a symptom of philosophy. 
1d: Human beings of age but under extreme medical duress, such as comas, brain trauma, or 
anesthetic drugs—we entertain tales of near-death experiences from the nearly 
brain-dead, and we worry (with indirect evidence that this has often happened) that 
anesthetics merely paralyze us and then make us forget the excrutiating experiences. 
1e: Medically healthy human beings whose minds have undergone extremely limited 
developmental paths, such as people extremely mentally impaired or people raised by 
wolves—there are live theories according to which consciousness is a sophisticated 
cultural achievement rather than a primitive biological achievement. 
1f: Apparently nonactual beings culled from philosophical thought experiments, such as 
alleged zombies, group minds, and homunculi or allegedly sentient subsystems within 
minds--as usual, theories and theorists disagree squarely about the proper assessment of 
such thought experiments, about what it is intuitive to say about imagined cases, and 
about whether the cases play tricks on intuitions. 
That leaves, as noncontroversial experiencers, only Human, Old-enough, Minimally-healthy, 
Incarnate Experiencers, or “Homies”, for short. I’m a Homie and I write as if you are too. If you 
doubt there are Homies besides yourself, feel free to treat the plural forms of “Homie” and 
“experiencer” as typos, and feel free to treat “we” and “us” as applying specifically to Your 
Highness.  
 
 Now, what sorts of Homie states are uncontroversial examples of experiences? Here I 
also count six categories of nonstarters, states too theoretically charged for us to begin with: 
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2a: Intuitively nonmental states, including both “outer” states such as one’s location and hair 
color, and “internal” states that contribute to behavior, such as the conditions of one’s 
digestive system, one’s atomic particles, and one’s brain chemicals—panpsychists can 
treat any of these states as experiences, and physicalists treat many brain states as mental 
states in disguise, and so as potentially experiential. 
2b: Aspects of our minds that are merely dispositional, such as forgetfulness, cleverness, and 
skills—since dispositions need not even be exercised to be real, it’s odd to imagine them 
constantly participating in our swarms of conscious experiences, but perhaps they 
participate in a way that is hard to separate out (forming part of a constant background of 
experience, say), or perhaps the subsystems underlying these dispositions within our 
minds have these states as their own experiences, separate from “ours” (see category 1f 
of controversial experiencers above).  
2c: Sensory-deprivation states such as those during sleep (including dreams and sleepwalking 
and sleeptalking), hypnosis, or deep meditation—perhaps dreams do not happen 
consciously during sleep, but instead dream scripts are nonexperientially smuggled into 
memory, so that upon waking we misremember ourselves as having had conscious dream 
experiences during sleep.   
2d: Individual states that persist through sleep, even if they also manifest themselves during 
wakefulness, such as beliefs (or, interchangeably, judgments), desires, and other 
“propositional attitudes”—if an attitude is nonexperiential during sleep, plausibly (though 
controversially) it is also nonexperiential during wakefulness, perhaps merely being 
accompanied during wakefulness by separable experiences (e.g, visual-imagery states) 
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that do not individually persist during sleep. So wakeful attitudes inherit controversial 
status from their sleepytime forms. 
I would also include emotions such as fear and hope in the category of attitudes that persist 
during sleep, and moods such as depression and happiness in the category of mere dispositions 
(to activate or suppress various emotions and other states). So emotions and moods are 
controversial cases to be postponed. Certain emotions and moods, and perhaps other states, 
might seem to be hybrids of dispositions, attitudes and experiential “feelings”, but in that case I 
assume it’s the “feeling” components that we need to focus on first, and not the hybrid states.  
2e: States that are deeply hidden from introspection, such as Freud’s repressed unconscious, 
“blindsight” states that enable blind people to guess correctly about visual stimuli, retinal 
states and other “drafts” in the early stages of vision, Heidegger’s alleged primordial 
ways of being in the world, and Chomsky’s alleged grammatical know-how—someone 
who maintains that these are experiential can easily explain away contrary intuitions by 
the fact that the states aren’t introspectible. 
2f: Introspectible states that aren’t clearly introspected, such as the fuzzy boundaries at the 
edges of our visual fields, the faint pressures around our bodies a moment before we 
attend to them, and fleeting, subliminal perceptions—maybe they contribute to 
experience; maybe they don’t; maybe they (or states in any of the other categories) are 
vague borderline cases that are not quite experiences and not quite nonexperiences. 
Fortunately, there are uncontroversial positive examples of conscious experiences, so I think it’s 
best to search first for principles and theories that work for these clear cases. In dealing with the 




Clear consciousness and meaning 
 
 I group the short remaining list of clear conscious experiences into four overlapping 
categories, with the general provisos that these states are only clearly conscious when they are 
clearly introspected by Homies: 
3a: (Mis)perceptions caused by sense organs, such as normal tastings or seeings of 
environmental objects, and degraded appearances of afterimages or ringing-in-the-ears. 
(Mis)perceptions differ from beliefs in being tightly bound to stimuli and behavior (such 
as guiding visuomotor skills), and being limited in reasoning and in subject matter. 
3b: Bodily sensations, such as diffuse sensations of warmth or muscular fatigue, and more 
pointlike pains, tickles, or itches. 
3c: Perception-like imaginings, such as voluntary envisioning or “replaying” of one’s own 
actions or perceptions, and involuntary nonlucid hallucinations—but excluding dreams, 
due to their occurrence during sleep. (The controversial status of dreams does not infect 
waking imaginings, because individual waking imaginings do not persist as dreams.) 
3d: Elements of “streams” or “trains” of thought, such as verbal talking to oneself, or reading 
with the mind’s eye, and nonverbal thinking in pictures or making predictions by running 
through a (scale) model in one’s head. Such thoughts differ from beliefs—for example, 
although a single belief may persist while one is sound asleep, no single thought does.  
 
 What does consciousness require? The first sign that there may be some dependence of 
consciousness on meaning is that all these clearest cases of conscious experience are clearly 
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representations. (It’s less plausible that meaning depends on consciousness, because not all clear 
mental representations are clearly conscious.) Perceptions and misperceptions typically indicate 
allegedly objective features of external objects. For example, a visual sensation might represent a 
certain spectral-reflectance feature or a shape feature at a certain place, or might categorize an 
object on the basis of many such features. Experiences of pressure, warmth, or limb-position 
involve bodily (mis)perceptions of pressure, warmth, or limb-position, while in pain experiences 
we (mis)represent parts of our bodies as throbbing, burning, stabbed, pounded, pinched, pulled, 
etc., and in each tickle or itch experience one represents parts of one’s body as being rubbed or 
prickled with very specific intensities, directions, speeds, and contact-point sizes. (Orgasms are 
left as an exercise for the old-enough.) Imaginings plausibly involve the same representational 
mechanisms involved in the later stages of perception and bodily sensation (i.e., the stages past 
sense organs and limited initial processing). And streams of thought seem to be constituted by 
imaginings of words or of speech acts, typically auditory or visual ones, as well as imaginings 
representing nonverbal items. It seems difficult to imagine a conscious state that represents 
nothing at all. And it seems difficult to vary what an experience is like without varying the 
experience’s subject matter, or how it represents its subject matter. (Some philosophers have 
tried, but their thought experiments take us far from clear cases.) So it’s tempting to view the 
representational features of experience as prerequisites for the conscious features of experience.  
 
 A second sign that there is some dependence of consciousness on meaning is that in all 
the clearest cases, conscious experiences are themselves represented by their bearers. A clearly 
conscious experience not only makes its subject matter seem to exist (with certain features), but 
also itself seems to exist (with certain features)—seeing blurrily or clearly, hurting severely or 
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mildly, forming images in one’s head or body, etc. As Nagel emphasizes (above), there is not 
only something it is like to see red or feel pain—a feature of the seeing or the pain—but 
something it is like for the organism. Since the state itself is obviously in the creature’s 
possession, “for” would be redundant unless it means in the creature’s view, so the requirement 
is plausibly that there is something the state is like as represented by the creature. Theorists 
differ about whether a creature introspects the state by thinking about it, or more primitively by 
inwardly perceiving it, or by having the state somehow be in part about itself. Theorists also 
differ on whether consciousness requires ongoing introspection or mere ease of introspectibility. 
But in any case for a creature to have clearly conscious experiences it must be capable of mental 
representation.  
 
Meaning and function 
 
 Now, what does mental representation require? The first sign that there is some 
dependence of meaning on teleological function is the nature of misrepresentation, of a misfit 
between what is meant and what is there. True beliefs, accurate perceptions, and fulfilled desires 
seem to meet some norms of success that are failed by false beliefs, misperceptions, and 
unfulfilled desires. A belief that it’s raining ought to go away when the rain does. These norms 
aren’t statistical norms (as if trillions of falsehoods were better than one), and aren’t moral norms 
(as if commandment XI were “thou shalt not miss thy guesses”). And it would be difficult to 
explain them as practical norms about means to one’s ends, since any desire for an end is itself a 
success or failure in the sense to be explained. So it’s tempting to try explaining the relevant 
norms in some fourth sense, as functions. Functions also aren’t statistical patterns (as if most 
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eggs and sperm developed into offspring), and aren’t moral principles (as if warped straightedges 
were crooked). And it would be difficult to explain functions as practical means to desired ends, 
since any desire for an end seems itself to have teleological functions in the sense to be 
explained.  
 
 On the other hand, some mental representations misrepresent without any failure or 
malfunction. Consider—and remember for later—the philosopher’s Swampman, a particle-for-
particle match for a Homie, suddenly and accidentally formed when lightning struck the muck. It 
would be a malfunction to believe in Swampman, since there’s no such being, but it isn’t a 
failure to have an idea of Swampman, or a defect to imagine that swamp lightning formed your 
physical twin. Nevertheless such representations have their own semantically-relevant 
teleological functions: under various circumstances ideas are supposed to help form beliefs and 
desires with related meanings, and under various circumstances imaginings are supposed to help 
test or practice the formation of beliefs and desires with related meanings. So it remains plausible 
that for a creature to have mental representations it must be capable of having teleological 
functions.  
 
 A second sign that meaning depends on functions is that both share many eerie features 
regarding how they enter into apparent explanations. (It’s less plausible that function depends on 
meaning, because not all things with functions have meaning.) Since this moves us squarely into 






 To emphasize what seems eerie about teleological explanations (and meaning-
explanations), I’ll contrast them with a pair of important, general, but familiar explanatory 
relations:  
4a: Constitution—For example, Angell Hall has as spatial “parts” giant stone Legolike 
blocks, has as temporal “slices” various Angell-Halls-on-a-Graduation-Day, and has as 
“aspects” greyness and quarantining philosophers. All these are kinds of constituents. 
4b: Causation—For example, laying the Legos increased the pressure on the pillars, and 
blocked the upward mobility of the quarantined. 
I’ll use “construction” to cover both constitution and causation. Throughout, I mean these 
broadly to include constituents and causes that work jointly with others, some perhaps 
contributing extremely little to the whole or to the effect. So “construct” stands for “help 
somewhat to constitute or cause”. 
 
 Now for the eerie contrasts (shared by teleological and meaning explanations): 
5a: Backward explanation--Barring eeriness within the constructive realm, later things can’t 
construct (constitute or cause) earlier things. But we routinely try to explain the existence 
of a belief or desire by properties of a future thing believed or desired, and the existence 
of an organ or tool by the future fulfillment of a function. 
5b: Circular explanation—Barring eeriness within the constructive realm, things can’t be 
constructed by things they help construct. But we routinely try to explain the existence of 
a belief, desire, organ, or tool by properties of a thing believed, desired, or had as a 
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function, even while we try to explain the existence of that thing as an effect of the belief, 
desire, organ, or tool.  
5c: Absent explanation—Things can’t construct what doesn’t exist (at some time), and things 
can’t be constructed by what doesn’t exist (at some time). But we routinely try to explain 
the existence of a belief, desire, organ, or tool by alleged properties of the thing believed, 
desired, or had as a function, even when that thing never comes to exist. 
5d: Explanation at a distance—Except in the most fundamental cases involving the tiniest 
things and spaces, we expect there to be deeper and deeper mechanisms explaining how 
things construct other things. But we routinely cite evidence and principles of reasoning 
as explaining “why” we perceive and believe what we do, and cite desires and intentions 
as explaining “why” we do what we do, without our knowing or much caring whether 
these lead to or fit with deeper explanations of “how”. And we routinely cite functions as 
explaining why objects do what they do, with little knowledge or care about whether 
these explanations lead to or fit with explanations of how they do what they do. 
 
Function and history 
 
 So what does teleological function require? It is obscure how we can talk about functions 
in a scientifically respectable way. If one thinks of the universe as so many randomly or lawfully 
crashing particles, it’s hard to resist the idea that the universe just is the way it is, and there are 
no “shoulds” or “functions” there for the scientist to describe. Nevertheless there seems to be a 
sharp break among scientists who act like they don’t need teleological notions, and scientists 
who act like they do need them. Using broad categories, that break falls between 
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microphysicists, chemists and macrophysicists on the “don’t” side, and biologists, social 
scientists, and engineers on the “do” side. (We can speak of atoms or molecules or volcanoes 
“functioning” in various ways, but this is a pun that means little more than that they have effects. 
It isn’t associated with the key teleological talk of them as succeeding or as failing, 
malfunctioning or being defective.) Functions seem to enter the universe when reproduction and 
selection does—with living beings and their artifacts—and this is the first sign that there is some 
dependence of function on evolutionary design.  
 
 “Backward-looking” or “etiological” theories of function accordingly try to show how 
histories of reproduction and selection generate teleological functions. Very roughly, the core 
etiological proposal is that some entity—call it e—has a certain function—call it f—if e exists 
because it is “copied” from similar ancestors that actually did f and thereby increased their 
probabilities of reproduction in competition with other things. Etiological theories treat functions 
as objective, at root determined independently of the theorist’s interests or of any other mental 
representations, and so make functions available for a reductive explanation of mental 
representation. And in Ruth Millikan’s hands, most impressively, etiology is carefully construed 
to unify biological and nonbiological functions, handling the functions of genes, body parts, 
instinctive behaviors, tools and other artifacts, customs, linguistic devices, mental states, and so 
on. 
 
 Etiological theories dispel the eeriness of teleological explanation by recasting it as 
constructive explanation. It’s not that some future or inexistent activity of an object explains, in a 
backward or absent way, the existence of an object. It’s that past occurrences of similar activities 
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explain—causally explain—the existence of the object. This introduces no circularity when the 
object causally explains the future fulfillment of its function. And instead of looking for gappy 
“why”-explanations distinct from “how”-explanations, we can look for 2nd-order how-
explanations: not “how (now) does this mechanism work”, but “how (in the past) did such a 
mechanism come to exist (or proliferate)”? That causal question can sometimes be answered 
with little knowledge or care about how the mechanism works. 
 
 Since Swampman (see previous section) would have no ancestors, no history of selection, 
on the etiological theory it would harbor no teleological functions. This functionlessness is little 
surprise. Swampman’s pulsating heartlike tissue would not be defective if it stopped pulsating, 
since nothing relevant to it would have set a standard for it to fail. Its lunglike tissue doesn’t 
inflate by (artificial or natural) design, but as a pure accident of the lightning striking the swamp. 
Grinding food is not a raison-d’etre of its teeth-alikes. These structures are like interesting but 
functionless volcanic formations. 
 
Job Two interrupts 
 
 But one scary growl from the brush, and Swampman zips toward the distant city lights, 
finally reaches your house door—locked—then quickly enters your shed by punching in your 
secret combination code. Apparently he hears and fears the growler, wants to protect himself, 
believes safety lies toward the light, and knows the right shed combination. But since 
Swampman has no evolutionary history, on the etiological theory he has no states with 
teleological functions, so he has no meaningful mental states. If he has no state that malfunctions 
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if there was no growl, he does not have a perception (or misperception) of a growl. If he has no 
state that fails if he doesn’t hide, then he has no desire to hide. He opens your lock by the sheer 
accident of being your molecular duplicate, not by knowing or even guessing what the 
combination is. This meaninglessness is all quite a surprise, but we can start to understand it. Just 
as there can be things that are similar to English sentences but that aren’t really meaningful 
sentences (e.g., gibberish, or shapes and sounds formed by the wind, or ink merely spilled on a 
page—mere meaningless sentence-alikes), so there can be things similar to thoughts but that 
aren’t really meaningful thoughts (e.g., perhaps data and programs in a laptop computer, or 
shapes and sounds and electrical discharge merely leaking in a soul or brain or mind—mere 
meaningless thought-alikes).  
 
 If it turned out we are all Swampfolks rather than evolved beings, there would be no 
thoughts at all, but only thought-alikes. A strange possibility, but one we can begin to get 
comfortable with, using the analogy of meaningless sentence-alikes. It wouldn’t surprise us to 
discover this; it would merely surprise-alike us to discover-alike this. Of course no one would 
bother even trying to talk or think if nothing means anything, but only because no one would 
bother trying anything (versus bother-alike-ing try-alike-ing). The meaningless talk-alikes and 
thought-alikes would just continue to happen. 
 
 Now if consciousness in turn depends on meaning, consciousness also depends on a 
history of reproduction and selection. Swampman would have no conscious experiences; there 
would be nothing any of his states is like for him. This nonconsciousness is a huge surprise. 
Meaningless sentence-alikes look or sound intrinsically like sentences with functions; all that’s 
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missing is the relational meaning. So it’s tempting to treat Swampman’s meaningless perception-
alikes and thought-alikes as sharing Nagel’s “subjective character” or Levine’s “qualitative 
character” with conscious perceptions and thoughts; all that’s missing is the nonintrinsic 
meaning about the external world. But without meaning and function there is also no internal 
world “for” a “subject”. No perceiving eyes, and no introspecting mind’s eye. We could describe 
some of Swampman’s states as experience-alikes, but since there would be nothing it is like for 
him to be in these states, in conscious respects they would be no more similar to conscious 
experiences than our own nonconscious states are. And to the extent that certain moral rules stem 
from what we may not do (or must do, or should do) to those who feel pain, since there is 
nothing it is like for Swampman to feel pains (or to feel-alike pain-alikes), these rules would not 
apply to our treatment of him. Apparently it’s not who your parents are, it’s whether you have 
parents.  
 
 When we try to get our heads around the possibility that we are Swampfolks, it seems 
even more mysterious how our states could be wholly nonconscious than it is how our states 
could be wholly meaningless. Our continued assurance that we have meaningful states, in the 
face of the possibility of being Swampfolks, might be based on a subtle working assumption—
we might as well act as if we have beliefs, since if we don’t, at least we’re not mistaken. Or it 
might be based on more elaborate reasoning, such as our considerable evidence that we are in 
fact evolved creatures. But our assurance that we have conscious states seems more directly 
supported than that. It’s tempting to say we know we are conscious just because we are 
conscious. This knowledge seems independent of the environment outside us because the 
conscious experiences seem independent of the environment outside us. Our pains, and our 
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resulting moral status, seem to be constituted only by how our mind-brains are here and now. Or 
perhaps they are partly constituted by a little bit of the environment—aspects of our bodies, or of 
the past few seconds of stimuli and behavior. But—slap to the head!—how could whether this 
hurts depend constitutively on distant facts about my evolutionary history? 
 
Job One continues 
 
 To secure functions for Swampman, and sometimes for other motivations, philosophers 
have tried three chief alternatives to the etiological theory, attempts to understand functions 
without dependence on evolutionary histories of reproduction and selection.  
 
Function without history 
 
 First, John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter argue that functions stem from “forward-
looking” survival-enhancing dispositions, rather than “backward-looking” survival-enhancing 
prior actitvities: 
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The etiological theory describes a character [= feature] now as serving a function, when it 
did confer propensities that improved the chances of survival. We suggest that it is 
appropriate, in such a case, to say that the character has been serving that function all 
along. Even before it had contributed … to survival, it had conferred a survival 
enhancing propensity on the creature. And to confer such a propensity, we suggest, is 
what constitutes a function. Something has a (biological) function just when it confers a 
survival-enhancing propensity on a creature that possesses it.  
So on this propensity theory Swampman’s structures, states, and processes have functions from 
the first moment if they are disposed to increase Swampman’s chances of survival.  
 
 Second, Robert Cummins dispenses with the teleological idea that functions stem from 
explaining existence or survival of function-bearers, and substitutes the idea that functions stem 
from contributions relatively simple things make to the relatively complex capacities of 
containing systems: 
x functions as a φ in s (or: the function of x in s is to φ) … just in case s’s capacity to ψ [is 
appropriately and adequately accounted for] by, in part, … the capacity of x to φ in s.  
An account of capacities “becomes less and less appropriate, and talk of functions makes less 
and less sense” as “the relative complexity of the organization of component parts/processes that 
is attributed to the system … becomes less and less significant”. On this organizational theory, 
from the first moment, Swampman’s complex capacities (to run, to open combination locks, etc.) 
can be accounted for by much simpler contributions of many of Swampman’s parts, so these 




 Third, John Searle reverses the dependence relations described in Job Two, maintaining 
that functions depend on conscious meaning. He says “functions are never intrinsic to the 
physics of any phenomenon but are assigned from the outside by conscious observers and users”: 
Thus given that we already accept that for organisms there is a value in survival and 
reproduction, and that for a species there is a value in continued existence, we can 
discover that the function of the heart is to pump blood …. If we thought the most 
important value in the world was to glorify God by making thumping noises, then the 
function of the heart would be to make a thumping noise …. 
On this attributional theory, from the first moment, Swampman harbors whatever functions our 
desires require him (or his parts) to achieve. We aren’t essential—Swampman’s own desires, or 
those of a bystanding deity, could provide the requirements. (And Searle thinks Swampman 
could have desires independently of functional attributions, because meaning and consciousness 
don’t after all depend on functions.)  
 
 Each of these three alternatives has some merit alongside that of etiology, and perhaps 
the dominant tendency is to a pluralism accepting versions of multiple theories as separately 
sufficient for functions. Perhaps “function” is ambiguous, and each theory is correct about a 
distinct concept of function. Perhaps different theories are best restricted to different sorts of 
function-bearers (say, etiological or propensity theories for biological organs, and organizational 
or attributional theories for artifacts). Lopping together an etiological theory with an independent 
nonetiological theory would enable Swampman to have functions (and meaningful 
representations, and consciousness), but doing so too quickly would be cheating ourselves. It 
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would give us no account of why we treat these different kinds of functions alike. It would give 
us no guidance about what other sources of functions there may be—if there are these four kinds 
of functions, why not also functions as activities we dislike, functions as propensities whose 
shortest representation in German rhymes with the shortest English representation of 
contributions to containing capacities, etc.? Pluralism without unity is for quitters. 
 
Function and construction 
 
 So I would first like to show how a general account of functions can generate improved 
versions of the main alternatives to the etiological account, and then use it also to derive the 
etiological account, unifying them all in the process. What I think functions have in common is 
their role in teleological explanation—the apparently eerie, apparently nonconstructive, 
backward/circular/absent/distant explanation described at the beginning of Job One.  
 
 Suppose e is an entity (object, event, fact, property, anything) with function f. The 
teleologist asks: why does e exist (at all, or with certain features)? The teleologist answers: 
because e does f. The “does f” is clearly constructive—meaning “helps constitute or cause f”. But 
since things malfunction, and teleology allows for absent explanation, “does f” has to be 
construed softly, perhaps as “possibly or conditionally or with increased probability helps 
construct f”. Since that’s a mouthful, I’ll risk misunderstanding and rely on the phrase “helps 
construct” to convey the softness. (Compare: we have no ready understanding of “I built the 
bridge, but in the end it didn’t get built” but we can easily understand “I helped build the bridge, 
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but in the end it didn’t get built”.) So the teleologist’s explanation is that e exists because e helps 
construct f. 
 
 My first suggestion is that this “because” also stands for constructive explanation, rather 
than for some eerie sui generis explanation. The teleologist cites a fact involving e (a possibility, 
or conditional fact, or probability) as constructing e (perhaps together with other causes or 
constituents of e—I will omit this for brevity). So this fact involving e would have to exist, and 
have powers of causation or constitution, even before e comes to exist. We can understand this 
preexisting fact as being a fact about what would (possibly or conditionally or probably) happen 
if e were to exist. It will be useful to have a mnemonic and a special notation for this allegedly 
preexisting fact involving e. I’ll call it the “funky fact” and write it with italics in funky braces. 
The teleologist accepts the formula: 
 {if e were to exist, e would help construct f} constructs e. 
To avoid the counterfactual mouthful, let me simplify the expression to: 
 {if e exists, e helps construct f} constructs e. 
My second suggestion is that at the most general level functions are whatever fs satisfy this 
formula. Hence the 
 
 BOLD CONSTRUCTIVE THEORY OF FUNCTIONS:  
 e has f as a function if and only if: {if e exists, e helps construct f} constructs e. 
 
The interesting thing is to understand the Ways such a preexisting funky fact involving e can 
construct e. I count five Ways for the construction to go, each of which relates closely to a 
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preexisting theory of functions, citing a factor that would, if in place, plausibly be sufficient for 
functions. If there are further Ways, I conjecture they will also cite arguable if not already 
familiar sources of functions. Or if not, they will exclude themselves by naturally suggesting 
further conditions in the same spirit, for a more cautious constructive theory of functions.  
 
The Way of Abstract Causation (Classical Teleology) 
 
 Nowadays it is normal to deny that abstract entities (e.g., properties themselves, as 
opposed to concrete instantiations of properties) have causal powers over what happens in the 
concrete world. Socrates sounds crazy when he insists that “as a consequence of the good”—
construed somewhat misleadingly as the property of being good—“existence and being are in 
things”. Today John Leslie sounds crazy—as crazy as anyone else who grapples with the 
problem of explaining why there is something rather than nothing—when he appeals similarly to 
causation by abstract goodness: 
An absence of all [concrete] existents truly would be in a way tragic because there might 
have been a good situation instead. And a situation sufficiently good—one which 
wouldn’t be rather a pity because something far better could be there in its place—could 
perhaps have an existence required not just ethically, but with creative effect. Without 
contradiction or other absurdity, perhaps, the goodness of something might bear 
responsibility for that something’s being more than merely possible. 
I agree there is room to argue (as Leslie does) for abstract causation; there is nothing absurd 
about it, and I can think of no systematic attempts to defend the bias against it. So imagine there 
are circumstances in which something’s being good can cause it to exist—purely, without help 
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from minds. (I also agree that there is nothing absurd about, and much to be said for, objective 
and mind-independent goodness, but that’s another story and this paper’d really better not go 
there. Meanwhile, pretend.) Then if it would be good for e to help construct f, this might team up 
with the funky fact {if e exists, e helps construct f} to cause e. However spooky, that would be a 
teleological explanation of e if anything would be. And if we reached that spooky discovery the 
first thing we would do is stop trying to demythologize or ignore Aristotle on final causes, and 
the second thing we would do is consider f a function of e, as required by the general theory. 
 
The Way of Representation (Desired Means) 
 
 We sometimes speak as if cognitive states (e.g., perceptions, beliefs, hypotheses) are 
under certain conditions caused by the facts they represent. We also speak as if some facts 
involving the future (especially possibilities, probabilities, and conditional facts) can exist before 
the future unfolds. If we are right, then a fact that p at time t can exist before time t, and perhaps 
before time t it can cause a future-oriented belief (or other cognition) that p at time t. Now 
substitute the funky fact above for p at time t. Suppose 
 {if e exists, e helps construct f} constructs a belief that {if e exists, e helps construct f}. 
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What would such a belief—underlined above—do in reasoning? The belief has the general form 
of a means-end belief; it is equivalent to the belief that e would be a means to f. So if one had a 
desire for f, and had the belief, one might reasonably form a desire for e as a result, through 
means-end reasoning. And if one is effective enough in action this desire for e might lead one to 
construct e itself. So when a desire for f constructs a desire for e through means-end reasoning, 
and this constructs e through effective action, and when the funky fact constructs the relevant 
means-belief, the funky fact indirectly constructs e, as follows: 
  funky fact      belief in funky fact 
                 +                        desire for e      e 
          desire for f   
This would satisfy the formula in the general constructive theory, so f would be a function of e 
when e is constructed as a desired (intended, believed-good) means to a desired end f. When e 
doesn’t in fact construct f (even though in a softer sense it “helps” construct f), e malfunctions. 
 
 I think this captures what is plausible about Searle’s attributional theory of functions. 
First, Searle places no restriction on whose values generate functions for an entity. He says “our” 
valuing survival generates a function for my heart of pumping blood, but so long as there is one 
being in the universe who values my death—a general misanthrope, or a bitter ex, or the 
neighbor’s dog—for all Searle says this equally generates a function for my heart of ceasing to 
pump blood. And doubtless in this wide world there is already someone who values glorifying 
God by making thumping noises, so my heart as well as his heart already has that function. But 
there is no useful sense in which my heart is defective whether it pumps blood or not, and no 
useful sense in which my heart’s thumping is its own function. By restricting the role of beliefs 
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and values to those that help construct an object—the designer’s or maintainer’s intentions and 
beliefs—the modified version of Searle’s theory enforces reasonable limitations on whose 
attributions stick.  
 
 Second Searle seems to think that valuing f makes f a function of anything that is a means 
to f, even if the valuer (is a designer or maintainer who) never intended or thought of the means. 
He says that even if no one ever heard of hearts, a desire for survival makes a heart have the 
function of pumping blood because hearts in fact contribute to survival by pumping blood. Now 
braided hair also contributes to survival under various circumstances, such as when some nearby 
bad guys happen to be out to kill anyone with unbraided hair. But even if a person’s survival is 
valued by the very person who constructs her hair braids (for show), this doesn’t give the hair 
braids a function of thwarting the bad guys. By restricting the function-endowing role to the 
specific means-end attitudes of the designer or maintainer, the modified attribution theory gets 
this right. 
 
 Third, not even designers and maintainers with relevant means-end thoughts may go 
hogwild in establishing functions. Even if I design and construct a tool, say a small handtool 
suitable for extracting pomegranate seeds, I cannot endow it with just any old function, such as 
establishing world peace, and thereby render it defective. Even if I sincerely believe that it would 
help construct world peace, and make it for that reason, if this belief is not caused by a (funky) 




Three Ways of Constitution 
 
 The third through fifth Ways (for a funky fact involving an entity to construct the entity) 
exploit a sense in which whole entities trivially inherit constructive relations (effects, or 
constitution of further wholes) from their constituents. If a part of Angell Hall helps cast a 
shadow to the west, then trivially Angell Hall helps cast the shadow. If a part of Angell Hall 
helps constitute an entrance to Mason Hall, then trivially Angell Hall helps constitute the 
entrance. (We have to be careful not to imagine that every part of Angell Hall is active in casting 
the shadow, or that every part of Angell Hall is within the entrance, but still, in a sense, and 
perhaps by courtesy, Angell Hall helps cast the shadow and helps constitute the entrance. I will 
omit these qualifiers for ease.) The importance of this inheritance is that it is trivial, that it is 
without further necessary conditions. If we treat e as a whole composed of constituents, and 
inheriting constructive powers from these constituents, we can understand a funky fact {if e were 
to exist, e would help construct f} as reducing to facts about what constituents of e do, perhaps 
independently of e’s existence.  
 
 The idea works as follows. Let c be a constituent of e. Then if c helps construct f, trivially 
e helps construct f. Now instead suppose e does not exist (yet), but c (already) does, and helps 
construct f. Then the following two conditions can easily hold prior to e’s existence: 
 if e were to exist, c would be a constituent of e, and 
 if e were to exist, c would help construct f. 
If both conditions hold, then trivially the funky fact holds: 
 {if e were to exist, e would help construct f}. 
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Since the funky fact is nothing more than the conjunction of the two conditions, for the funky 
fact to construct e all we need is for the two conditions to construct e. This occurs when c’s 
activity (f) helps construct e. Then we have e existing because {if e exists, e helps construct f}, 
which satisfies the theory of functions. 
 
 Well, it does so with one further complication. As soon as e comes to exist through 
constituent c’s activity f, e trivially inherits c’s activity, so it may be in a sense that e 
automatically constructs the f that helps constructs it. If f is a function of e, then in that sense e 
automatically fulfills its function. To allow for teleological malfunction, e’s function must be a 
further performance of f, beyond the performance of f that constructs e.  
 
 There are three resulting Ways to satisfy the general theory of functions, because there 
are three kinds of constituents: spatial parts (the Lego blocks helping to make up Angell Hall), 
temporal slices (the Angell-Halls-on-a-Graduation-Day helping to make up Angell Hall), and 
aspects (the greyness helping to make up Angell Hall). 
 
The Way of Spatial Parts (Containing Systems) 
 
 Let p be one of the spatial parts of e, and substitute it in the reasoning about constituent c 
above. Here e is something larger than p, something that contains p as well as other spatial parts. 
For the existence of the funky fact {if e were to exist, e would help construct f} we need these 
two conditions to hold prior to e’s existence: 
 if e were to exist, p would be a part of e, and 
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 if e were to exist, p would help construct f, 
This funky fact constructs e when these two conditions construct e. This happens when e’s 
organization (out of various smaller spatial parts) is created or sustained by the activity (f) of part 
p, when what p does helps bind e together. In this case, e has (further) performance of f as a 
function. 
 
 I think this captures what is plausible, for the generation of functions, about Cummins’s 
emphasis on the organization of containing systems. First, Cummins’ is rightly concerned about 
the following trivialization of his theory: 
[N]o matter which effects of something you happen to name, there will be some activity 
of the containing system to which just those effects contribute, or some condition of the 
containing system which is maintained with the help of just those effects. Heart activity, 
for example, keeps the circulatory system from being entirely quiet, and the appendix 
keeps people vulnerable to appendicitis. 
To exclude these nonfunctions, he tries restricting functions to relatively complex systems 
organized out of relatively simple parts. But this does not do the trick. By his standards a heart’s 
pumping blood has to count as a simple part of the whole relatively complex circulatory system. 
But then a heart’s noisily pumping blood must count as an equally simple part of the whole 
relatively complex noisy-circulatory system. Furthermore, even simple systems can succeed or 
fail, in as full-blooded a sense as complex ones can. On the modified organizational view here, 
what excludes the heart noise is that the noise doesn’t help to organize the circulatory system (or 
the noisy-circulatory system), the noise doesn’t help bind or keep the spatial parts together.  
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 Second, under the stated conditions the organization of a system does not necessarily 
endow the parts of the system with functions, but it does necessarily endow the whole with 
functions. If e’s part p ceases to perform f, something is wrong teleologically with e. It’s not 
necessarily the case that p malfunctions, since the problem may lie elsewhere in e. But e as a 
whole malfunctions. If a heart doesn’t pump blood, this may be because all the blood has drained 
out through a hole in the foot. That’s not a defective heart, it’s a defective foot—a defective 
containing system. Hearts can get their own functions by themselves having parts that organize 
into hearts, or in any of the other Ways described above and below. 
 
The Way of Temporal Slices (Self-driven Survival) 
 
 Now let s be one of the temporal slices of e. In this case, e is a temporally extended 
“worm”. For e (the whole extended worm) to exist is for e to survive (or persist) from one time to 
another. For the existence of the funky fact {if e were to exist, e would help construct f} we need 
these two conditions to hold prior to e’s survival: 
 if e were to survive, s would be a slice of e, and 
 if e were to survive, s would help construct f. 
The funky fact constructs e when these two conditions construct e. This happens when e’s 
survival is caused by e’s own past activity (s’s doing f).  
 
 As before I think this captures what is plausible in Bigelow and Pargetter’s propensity 
theory. As in their theory, there is no need for the activity of “ancestors” of e. This is because s, 
being a time slice, is capable of causing f and thereby causing e to survive (persist). You can 
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think of later time slices as being reproduced from ancestral time slices, in which case the later 
time slices have f as their etiological functions, or you can think of them all as being part of the 
worm, so that the worm itself has nonetiological functions. The worm as a whole needn’t have 
ancestors. Even if you have no ancestors, you can develop functions by contributing to your own 
survival.  
 
 But there should still be a need for actual survival activity in the immediate, recent, or 
distant history of the creature. Otherwise there is no way to apply their notion of a propensity, 
because as Bigelow and Pargetter acknowledge, propensities are relative to particular conditions: 
[A] character [= feature] may confer propensities which are survival enhancing in the 
creature’s usual habitat, but which would be lethal elsewhere. When we speak of the 
function of a character, therefore, we mean that the character generates propensities that 
are survival-enhancing in the creature’s natural habitat.  
For a creature without any history (such as Swampman at the first moment) there is no such 
thing as its “usual” habitat. Even for a creature with a history, we can’t count “usualness” merely 
by time spent. Suppose that unbeknownst to us, after each five minute period we spend in this 
dog-eat-dog world, we are whisked away to a protected environment for an hour to “recharge” in 
suspended animation, and then rereleased into the wild for the next five minutes. Statistically our 
usual habitat is the recharging station. But our function-relevant habitat is our statistically 
unusual world where we (even if not our ancestors) perform actual survival-enhancing activities, 
as reflected in the modified propensity theory. 
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 Given a (possibly very brief) history of survival-enhancing activity in an environment, 
propensities in that environment drop out as unnecessary. If a creature survives by its own 
activity in an environment, but more by fortunate activity than by the exercise of a reliable 
propensity, this still establishes a norm for similar activity to live up to. Full-blooded teleological 
explanation allows not only for entities that happen not to fulfill their functions, but for entities 
that cannot (reliably, without great luck) fulfill their function in their natural habitat—entities 
without a propensity to fulfill their function. A failing heart does not stop failing at the moment it 
loses all propensity to pump blood. At that moment it fails worse. 
 
The Way of Aspects (Reproduction and Selection) 
 
 Finally, let a be one of the aspects of e. For the existence of the funky fact {if e were to 
exist, e would help construct f} we need these two conditions to hold prior to e’s existence: 
 if e were to exist, a would be an aspect of e, and 
 if e were to exist, a would help construct f. 
The funky fact constructs e when these two conditions construct e. Assuming aspects are abstract 
objects (e.g., properties), and barring direct causation by abstract objects, for an aspect of e to 
cause e, it must be instantiated in something prior to e. Suppose that a is so instantiated, and 
thereby its activity (f) constructs e. The prior thing is similar to e (at least in sharing aspect a), 
and its similarity is relevant to causing e (via f). This prior thing is therefore an “ancestor” of e in 
Millikan’s sense, one that “reproduced” to form the similar “copy” e. Now, since the ancestor did 
f in virtue of having property a, we can say that a helped construct f. Unless e is very different 
from the ancestor, then, if e had existed (perhaps in place of the ancestor), it would have helped 
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construct f. So again we have the preexisting funky fact {if e exists, e helps construct f}, and we 
satisfy the general theory of functions. 
 
 I think that tracing out this line of thought in more detail would lead to an improved 
formulation of the etiological theory of functions, better able to handle counterexamples and 
complaints about it as a stipulative change of subject. But for now suffice it to say that there 
seems to be a way to justify versions of all the leading theories of functions, under the unified “e 
exists because e would construct f” rubric. 
 
Job One is Done; Job Two is Due 
 
 While a history of reproduction and selection stands as one Way to have functions, it is 
not the only Way. Things suddenly created by the Form of the Good can have functions via their 
classical final causes. Things suddenly created by intelligent design can have functions by the 
means-end reasoning of their designers. Things suddenly created by lightning in the swamp can 
quickly acquire functions by their own survival activity and the activity of their parts in 
maintaining their organization. Under the right circumstances Swampman can have conscious 
mental representations from moment two, even if not from moment one. Our assurance that we 
are conscious, in the face of the possibility that we are Swampfolks, need not rely on our theories 
of evolution by natural selection of distant ancestors. Though not quite immediate and certain, it 
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